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ABSTRACT 
 
The Center for Computer-Assisted Legal Instruction 
(CALI) is a non-profit organization whose mission is to 
advance legal education through technological innovation 
and collaboration. With its eLangdell Press project, CALI 
publishes American law school textbooks in open access, 
royalty-free form, offering faculty authors compensation 
equivalent to what most law school textbook authors would 
earn in royalties from a traditional full-price publisher. I 
am writing a new sales textbook and “agreements 
supplement” based on contemporary business practice that 
I will publish in open access form with CALI’s eLangdell 
Press. Relatively few other American legal academics 
publish in open access form, however, suggesting that the 
market for textbooks may be “locked-in” to a principal-
agent conflict between students and faculty members. If 
American law students organized a website showing the 
textbook costs of all law faculty members at all law 
schools, they might be able to use a “naming and shaming” 
strategy to overcome faculty “lock-in” to high-priced 
textbooks and increase the adoption of open access 
textbooks. 
 
                                                                                                             
* Jane K. Winn, Charles I. Stone Professor, University of Washington 
School of Law. Thanks to Sam Baldwin, John Mayer and Mary Whisner for 
feedback on earlier drafts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For a faculty member, the question of why most law school 
textbooks cost so much and why “disruptive” publishing models 
are gaining so little traction in legal education is merely of 
academic interest. For our students, however, these issues are yet 
another example of how the current system of legal education is 
unresponsive to their needs and concerns. In this essay, I will 
describe The Center for Computer Assisted Legal Instruction 
(CALI) eLangdell Press open access textbook publishing project as 
well as the sales law textbook and “agreements supplement” I am 
writing that will be published by CALI eLangdell Press. I will 
highlight some of the market failures apparently retarding the 
production and adoption of non-traditional textbooks in legal 
education. Although these barriers to innovation in the American 
legal textbook market are significant, they are not insurmountable. 
Given that law students have the most to gain from alternative, 
cheaper textbooks, it might make sense for law students to launch a 
“naming and shaming” strategy to give law faculty members 
greater incentives to produce and adopt open access textbooks. 
CALI is a non-profit organization whose mission is to advance 
legal education through technological innovation and 
collaboration, and its funding comes from its member law schools, 
which include more than ninety-five percent of all accredited law 
schools in America. I have served on the board of directors of 
CALI since 1998. For decades, CALI has been at the forefront of 
harnessing technological innovation to improve student learning 
outcomes. Once I decided to publish a new textbook, the choice for 
me as a board member to publish my textbook with CALI might 
seem obvious. But the CALI eLangdell Press does not rely on 
altruism or board seats to motivate authors to publish royalty-free 
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textbooks. CALI has an editorial board that reviews proposals from 
prospective authors and offers to those authors whose books are 
selected for publication a lump-sum, up-front royalty equivalent to 
that provided by most traditional publishers for the same work. 
Given that the CALI eLangdell Press project is now offering 
incentives similar to those offered by traditional publishers, it is 
surprising how few faculty members have contributed or adopted 
eLangdell Press textbooks. To explore the causes of the slow take-
up of open access publishing generally and the counter-veiling 
motivations of those faculty members who have chosen to publish 
in open access form, I invited several colleagues who have already 
published open access textbooks to contribute short essays 
discussing their experiences: 
 
 James Boyle & Jennifer Jenkins, Open Legal Educational 
Materials: The Frequently Asked Questions, 11 WASH. J.L. 
TECH. & ARTS 13 (2015). 
 Joseph Scott Miller & Lydia Pallas Loren, The Idea of the 
Casebook: Pedagogy, Prestige, and Trusty Platforms, 11 
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 31 (2015). 
 Eric Goldman & Rebecca Tushnet, Self-Publishing an 
Electronic Casebook Benefited Our Readers—And Us, 11 
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 49 (2015). 
 
Our goal in publishing these essays is to encourage more faculty 
members to engage in the debate about what they can do about the 
high price of traditional textbooks, and to consider adopting or 
even authoring open access textbooks.1  
 
I. SALES LAW FOR A NEW CENTURY AND AGREEMENTS 
SUPPLEMENT 
 
After I began studying the use of sales contracts as governance 
mechanisms in global supply chains over a decade ago, I 
discovered a gap between the contemporary American business 
                                                                                                             
1 My colleagues and I thank the student editors of the Washington Journal 
of Law, Technology & Arts for publishing these essays. 
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practices I was learning about in my research and the orientation of 
every single sales law textbook on the market today. After teaching 
sales law with many different textbooks over several years, I 
concluded that the yawning gap between sales law in textbooks 
and sales law in action exists for the following reasons: 
 
 Although Karl Llewellyn often achieved his goal of creating 
a neutral framework for transactions that could 
accommodate innovation in business practice with the 
provisions of Article 2, he also often failed. Among the most 
anachronistic provisions in UCC Article 2 are UCC § 1-303 
Usage of Trade, UCC § 2-205 Merchant Firm Offers, UCC § 
2-207 Battle of the Forms, and UCC § 2-306 Requirement 
and Output Contracts, all of which feature prominently in 
sales law textbooks. Yet none of the textbooks on the market 
today highlight the growing irrelevance of these provisions 
to contemporary business practice. 
 When parties succeed in implementing best practices for 
supply chain management, the rate of litigation drops sharply 
because fewer disputes worth litigating arise in the first 
place, and those that do are arbitrated.2 As a result, the facts 
of litigated Article 2 cases are increasingly less 
representative of current best business practices. They 
usually consist of a comedy of errors by parties who haven’t 
got a clue what the best practices for supply chain 
management are, while parties who are doing supply chain 
                                                                                                             
2 Proving a negative is always difficult. This generalization is based on the 
small number of reported judicial decisions involving master supply agreements 
in recent decades when the use of master supply agreements among trading 
partners increased rapidly, and years of interviews with subject matter experts.  
For example, Walmart alone accounts for more than 10% of the U.S. retail 
market but there appears to be only one reported judicial decision involving sale 
of goods dispute between Walmart and a supplier. General Trading Int’l, Inc., v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 320 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2003); STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/309250/walmart-stores-retail-market-share-in-
the-us/ (chart showing retail market share of Walmart Stores in the United States 
in 2012 and 2013, based on share of retail sales). See also Ronald J. Gilson, 
Charles F. Sabel and Robert E. Scott, Contract and Innovation: The Limited 
Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 170, 178 (2013) (major innovations in contract design make 
considerable progress outside the courts before finally being tested in litigation). 
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management the right way are almost entirely absent from 
reported judicial decisions. Careful study of recent sales law 
cases can only illustrate what not to do; it provides little or 
no information about what contracting parties should be 
doing. 
 It is almost impossible to get a copy of the actual sales 
contracts at issue in litigated disputes because of the 
widespread practice of parties to commercial disputes 
requesting that courts seal records. Teaching sales contract 
drafting and negotiation from cases without access to the 
entire contract tends to frame issues from an ex post 
perspective rather than simulating the ex ante perspective 
within which contract negotiation and drafting actually 
occur.3 
I eventually decided that the best way for me to prepare my 
students for twenty-first century law practice was to create a new 
textbook that combines both traditional statutory and case analysis 
with information about contemporary commercial practice and 
client requirements. 
To help students learn to switch from an ex post litigation 
perspective on contract drafting to an ex ante negotiation 
perspective, I have been developing contract drafting exercises 
based on actual sales contracts taken from the Security and 
Exchange Commission’s “Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, 
and Retrieval” (EDGAR) database.4 It is an interesting question in 
intellectual property law whether it would be fair use for a law 
faculty member to incorporate a sales contract from the EDGAR 
database into a textbook, and reasonable minds might differ about 
the answer to that question. Given that I will have to sign the CALI 
author agreement warranting that I own or have licensed the 
intellectual property in all the content I am providing, I concluded I 
should create my own sales contracts after analyzing examples of 
                                                                                                             
3 See generally Jane K. Winn, Llewellyn Has Left the Building: The 
Growing Irrelevance of the UCC to 21st Century Sales Law (Dec. 29, 2014), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2543663. 
4 Under the Securities Act of 1933, publicly listed companies are required 
to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission on a regular basis certain 
financial information as well as “material contracts.” 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2000).  
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EDGAR contracts. A collection of these EDGAR-like agreements 
will be combined into an “agreement supplement” that students 
will use in addition to their textbook and statutory supplement. 
Problems based on hypothetical fact patterns and contract drafting 
exercises in my sales law textbook will be keyed to the provisions 
of various agreements in the agreements supplement. But any 
faculty member teaching sales or contracts will be free to 
incorporate any or all of the agreements in the agreement 
supplement into their own classes. 
In order for students in sales law to understand how 
anachronistic the “Battle of the Forms” problem has become for 
most businesses in America today, they need to be able to study 
what has taken the place of the Battle of the Forms: a “framework” 
sales contract that might be called a “master agreement” or a 
“supply agreement” that is ten, twenty or more pages long and has 
a term of one or more years. By cross-referencing issues based on 
Battle of the Forms fact patterns discussed in cases with strategies 
currently in use for addressing the same issues under framework 
agreements, students will see for themselves which provisions of 
Article 2 have become anachronistic and why. 
 
II. LOCK-IN TO PRINCIPAL-AGENT CONFLICTS 
 
As of 2013, the cost of the average college textbook in the 
United States had risen 812 percent since 1978, while the increase 
in the Consumer Price Index was only 250 percent and the increase 
for medical services was 575 percent for the same period.5 
Although no one has collected and published similar statistics for 
law school textbooks, the results would probably be similar. 
Textbooks and medical services suffer from market failures and 
skyrocketing prices for similar reasons: persistent “principal-
agent” conflicts.  
Under agency theory in economics, a principal hires an agent 
to work for the principal, but can only monitor the agent’s 
performance imperfectly without in effect doing the agent’s work 
                                                                                                             
5 Jordan Weissmann, Why Are College Textbooks So Absurdly Expensive?, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 3, 2013), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2013/01/why-are-college-textbooks-so-absurdly-expensive/266801. 
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for him and losing the economic benefits of the delegation.6 The 
principal can enjoy the economic benefit of the delegation if she 
can design an “incentive contract” that rewards the agent for 
internalizing the principal’s interests and punishes the agent for 
pursuing his own interest at the principal’s expense.7 If law 
students are the “principals” of legal education because it is their 
tuition dollars that keep the doors open, and law faculty members 
are “agents” that deliver legal education services to their principals 
(including grading their performance), then that may help explain 
why the principal-agent conflict in textbook markets is as acute 
and intractable as it is. 
Other institutional characteristics of the market for textbooks 
may also contribute to the problem. Formal and informal standards 
in the market for traditional law school textbooks combine to 
create a kind of “network” with strong positive network 
externalities for faculty members.8 As a result, the cost for faculty 
members to switch to a different network based on alternative 
textbooks would be high. If law school textbook publishers play 
the role of “platform operator” in the traditional law school 
textbook market, then faculty as well as students may find it hard 
to switch to a different platform.9 As platform operators, traditional 
textbook publishers can charge high prices to students and use the 
revenue from those high prices to subsidize the production and 
adoption of traditional textbooks by law faculty members. The 
subsidies for production of traditional law school textbooks come 
in the form of a promise of copyright royalty payments and the 
social prestige of being recognized as a textbook author among the 
author’s academic peers. The subsidies for faculty members who 
adopt their products come in the form of teaching manuals and 
other support services to reduce the effort required to teach law 
                                                                                                             
6 See generally Robert Gibbons, Incentives in Organizations, 12 J.  ECON. 
PERSP. 115-132 (1998). 
7 This may be difficult to do, however. See generally Steven Kerr, On the 
Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 769 (1975). 
8 See generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 
(1999). 
9 See Joseph Scott Miller & Lydia Pallas Loren, The Idea of the Casebook: 
Pedagogy, Prestige, and Trusty Platforms, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 31 
(2015). 
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school classes. For widely adopted textbooks, the creation of a de 
facto community of adopters who can share ideas about teaching 
may also serve to reduce the effort required to teach classes. 
The slow progress in persuading law school faculty members 
to migrate from the existing high-priced textbook platform 
maintained by traditional publishers to new networks based on 
open access publishing models suggests that none of the alternative 
publishers have yet developed a winning platform competition 
strategy. CALI offers a significant one-time, up-front payment to 
textbook authors in exchange for the license to reproduce their 
works in open access form, but that has not yet persuaded many 
law school textbook authors or adopters to switch to open access 
textbooks. If the market for textbooks were a conventional 
competitive market, then modest product innovations and 
reasonable remuneration might have been enough to “tip” the 
textbook market toward open access publishing. But the textbook 
market appears to be characterized by strong network effects and 
traditional textbook publishers seem to be formidable platform 
operators. Much more powerful incentives than those already 
offered by alternative textbook publishers will be required to 
overcome lock-in to principal-agent conflicts in textbook markets. 
Fortunately for law students, however, technology and business 
innovations occurring outside of legal education may have already 
given them the tools they need to create incentives strong enough 
to motivate faculty members to respond to their concerns about the 
high price of traditional textbooks. 
 
III. SHARING OWNERSHIP OF THE PROBLEM 
 
In recent decades, technological innovation has dramatically 
lowered the cost of creating communities based on shared 
consumption preferences. Well known examples of collaborative 
consumption communities include networks for sharing access to 
resources such as Zip Car, Uber or AirBnB, or for sharing access 
to opinions such as Yelp or TripAdvisor. The rise of sharing-
economy business models is an example of what Clayton 
Christensen labeled “disruptive innovation” in his 1997 book, The 
Innovator’s Dilemma. Christensen noted that most innovation is 
“sustaining innovation” which improves the performance of 
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established products and services in a manner consistent with the 
expectations of most clients. The incremental innovations 
characteristic of traditional high-priced textbook publishing are 
examples of sustaining innovations that please the faculty authors 
and adopters of textbooks. By contrast, disruptive innovations 
often appear initially to underperform existing products and 
services, but appeal to price-sensitive clients because they are 
simpler and cheaper than mainstream products. A classic example 
of a disruptive innovation that eventually bankrupted a once 
dominant incumbent is the competition between Netflix and 
Blockbuster Video. When Netflix started offering classic movie 
rentals by postal mail with no late fees in 1997, Blockbuster was 
confident that its core customer base would never be interested in 
such a service. In 2010, Blockbuster filed for bankruptcy after its 
core customer base was lured away by streaming video offered by 
Netflix and others that did not depend on charging customers late 
fees to be profitable.  
Alternative textbook publishers such as the CALI eLangdell 
Press are trying to play the role of “disruptors” in the market for 
law school textbooks. Because law students are the ones who 
would benefit most if textbook markets “tip” away from traditional 
publishers and toward disruptive open access publishers, 
alternative textbook publishers would benefit from finding a way 
to leverage law student frustration with high textbook prices to 
accelerate that tipping process. 
One way law students across the country could channel their 
frustration and support the work of alternative open access 
publishers would be to create a national online database of 
textbook costs organized according to faculty member and law 
school. Individual students at each American law school could 
contribute information about the prices of the textbooks they were 
required to purchase for the courses they take. With enough 
student support, an accurate, detailed picture would emerge about 
relative textbook adoption costs within a relatively short time. 
Such an online reporting system could be a collaborative 
production platform similar to Wikipedia, Yelp or TripAdvisor. If 
the website were programmed to generate reports in response to 
queries, then other law students would be able to compare textbook 
adoption costs before registering for courses.  
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Although some collaborative production systems operate on a 
strictly voluntary basis, many such as Wikipedia cannot operate 
without cash contributions as well as in-kind contributions from 
members. Because the population of law students is constantly 
shifting and the status of law students is only temporary, it would 
be hard to maintain such a project with only voluntary 
contributions. In addition, the level of technological sophistication 
required to create and maintain such a site might be more than law 
student volunteers could manage.  It might therefore be necessary 
to use a collaborative fundraising system such as Kickstarter or 
solicit donations from users to raise the money to pay technology 
professionals to build and maintain the system. 
Once information about relative textbook costs is made freely 
available, law students need not be the only ones to make use of it. 
The problem of the high cost of textbooks might finally become 
salient to law school administrators and the majority of law school 
faculty members if it were quick and easy to learn about relative 
textbook adoption costs. Law school administrators could take 
relative textbook adoption costs into account during the annual 
faculty merit review process, as could national educational rating 
services such as U.S. News & World Report. 
An Internet “naming and shaming” campaign organized by law 
students would encourage law school faculty members and deans 
to recognize the magnitude of benefits law students would reap 
from a general migration from traditional full-price textbooks to 
open access textbooks. Few law school faculty members actually 
benefit directly from the high price of law school textbooks. If law 
students can increase the reputational “cost” to most faculty 
members of adopting traditional full-price textbooks, then the 
majority of faculty members who never directly benefited from 
textbook royalties under the current system might finally begin 
looking in earnest for open access alternatives.  
Most American law faculty members would likely bristle at the 
suggestion that they have been “shirking” their fiduciary duties to 
law students when they create or adopt high-priced traditional 
textbooks instead of creating or adopting open access alternatives. 
This may be because they are simply unaware of the impact of the 
cost of textbooks on law students. For law faculty members who 
inadvertently choose high-priced textbooks when low-priced 
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textbooks of equivalent quality are available, collaborative 
collection and distribution by law students of relative textbook 
adoption costs could provide them with the information they need 
to make more informed choices. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The institutional characteristics of the market for textbooks are 
too subtle and complex to be described accurately in a short essay 
such as this, let alone fully analyzed. This essay merely suggests 
that the market for law school textbooks appears to be “locked-in” 
to significant principal-agent conflicts. Open access publishers are 
working to disrupt the traditional textbook market, but have only 
enjoyed limited success to date. The slow migration away from 
high-priced traditional textbooks and toward open access 
publishing suggests that the disruptors have not yet been able to 
mobilize strong enough incentives to get the textbook market to 
“tip.” If alternative textbook publishers and law students were able 
to join forces, however, that might accelerate the migration. Law 
students could launch a “naming and shaming” campaign to 
encourage faculty members to switch to open access textbooks by 
organizing a national online database with information about 
relative textbook adoption costs within and across law schools in 
America. 
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